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parties, as was the case in Estate of Stinson v. United States,17
the amount taken into account as a disposition triggering
recognition of unreported gain attributable to the obligation is
not less than theface amount of the installment obligation.18
Thus, depending upon the income tax basis of the farmland
sold to the corporation in Stinson,19 there could have been a
substantial amount of gain from the forgiveness of the
$147,000 principal amount.
Other gift tax concerns
Another possible challenge in Stinson20 which would likely
have arisen had the forgiveness continued until sale of the
property in 1990, is that consistent and regular forgiveness of
obligations to pay can result in the forgiveness being
considered a gift rather than a sale as of the date of the
transaction.21  That would have meant that the entire
forgiveness would have been a gift in 1981 with the donees
not receiving a new income tax basis derived from the
purchase price but rather would have had a carryover basis
from the donor.22
In conclusion…
The holding in Estate of Stinson v. United States23 hat the
gift was a gift of a future interest to shareholders increased
the amount of adjusted taxable gifts and boosted the federal
estate tax liability.  However, the outcome could have been
even more disadvantageous to the estate and the heirs had the
other two issues been raised successfully by the Internal
Revenue Service.
Quite clearly, any gift should be handled with care; a gift of
installment payments to a corporate purchaser deserves even
more careful handling in light of the possible consequences to
the seller (and the seller’s estate) and the donees.
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CASES, REGULATIONS AND STATUTES
by Robert P. Achenbach, Jr.
BANKRUPTCY
GENERAL   -ALM § 13.03.*
ESTATE PROPERTY . The debtor was a watermelon
and squash farmer who had suffered crop losses in 1998 and
filed for Chapter 7 in February 1999. The debtor filed an
application for disaster payments under the Crop Loss
Disaster Assistance Program in April 1999 and a disaster
payment was sent to the trustee. The debtor sought the
recovery of the disaster payment from the trustee as not part
of the bankruptcy estate because the debtor was not entitled
to the payment as of the petition date. The court held that the
disaster payment was estate property because all of the
qualifying requirements, planting the crops and the disaster
losses, occurred prior to the bankruptcy case petition. In
addition, the court held that the disaster payments were the
proceeds of the crops and included in the estate property. In
re Boyett, 250 B.R. 817 (Bankr. S.D. Ga. 2000).
EXEMPTIONS
DISASTER PAYMENTS. The debtor was a watermelon
and squash farmer who had suffered crop losses in 1998 and
filed for Chapter 7 in February 1999. The debtor filed an
application for disaster payments under the Crop Loss
Disaster Assistance Program in April 1999 and a disaster
payment was sent to the trustee. The debtor sought to exempt
the payment under Ga. Stat. § 44-13-100 as public assistance.
The court held that the exemption was limited to “local
public assistance” which did not include federal farm disaster
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payments. In re Boyett, 250 B.R. 817 (Bankr. S.D. Ga.
2000).
FEDERAL TAX     -ALM § 13.03[7].*
DISCHARGE. The debtor owed taxes for several tax
years. On the day before the filing of the Chapter 7 petition,
the IRS attempted to levy against the debtor’s property by
attempting to inventory the debtor’s property. However, the
debtor refused to allow the IRS agents to enter the debtor’s
property to conduct the inventory, even after being informed
that the refusal was a violation of law and a court order. The
court held that, under In re Griffith, 206 F.3d 1389 (11th Cir.
2000), the single act of violating the court order authorizing
the IRS levy was an affirmative act to attempt to defeat or
evade payment of taxes sufficient to deny discharge of the tax
claim. In re Gillis, 2000-2 U.S. Tax Cas. (CCH) ¶ 50,713
(Bankr. S.D. Ga. 2000).
POST-PETITION INTEREST. The Chapter 7 trustee did
not file or pay the bankruptcy estate’s income taxes for the
four years of the case until the last year. The IRS added
penalties and interest to the estate’s tax liability.  The estate’s
taxes and penalties were accorded administrative claim
priority but the debtor argued that the interest on the taxes
was not entitled to administrative claim priority. The IRS
argued that the bankruptcy statute was not clear and that
Section 503(b)(1) should be interpreted to include the interest
as part of the taxes owed. The court held that Section
503(b)(1)(B) was clear and provided administrative claim
priority only to taxes and penalties; therefore, the interest on
the taxes was entitled only to a fifth priority as provided by
Section 726(a)(5). In re Weinstein, 2000-2 U.S. Tax Cas.
(CCH) ¶ 50,714 (Bankr. 1st Cir. 2000).
SOCIAL SECURITY BENEFITS. The debtor had
become eligible for social security benefits pre-petition and
the IRS had filed a tax lien pre-petition. The debtor received
a discharge of all taxes but the tax lien survived the
bankruptcy case. The limitation period for collection by the
IRS had not expired, due to tolling of the limitation period by
an offer in compromise and the filing of the bankruptcy case,
and the IRS attempted to levy on the debtor’s monthly social
security payments. The court held that the social security
payments were subject to the tax lien and levy but the levy
was restricted by I.R.C. § 6331(h) to no more than 15 percent
of the monthly payments. I  re Anderson, 250 B.R. 707
(Bankr. D. Mont. 2000).
FEDERAL AGRICULTURAL
PROGRAMS
CROP INSURANCE. The FCIC has issued interim
regulations which amend the rice crop insurance provisions
to provide coverage for losses (resulting from failure of
irrigation water supplies due to drought and intrusion of
saline water) as mandated by section 508(a)(8) of the Federal
Crop Insurance Act. 65 Fed. Reg. 56773 (Sept. 20, 2000).
ENVIRONMENTAL PROCEDURES . The FSA has
issued proposed revised regulations governing the
environmental policies and procedures required under the
National Environmental Policy Act and the Council on
Environmental Quality. The new regulations revise the
existing regulations to reflect the organizational changes in
the USDA and to streamline the procedures used to comply
with the NEPA and CEQ. 65 Fed. Reg. 55783 (Sept. 14,
2000).
FARM EMERGENCY LOANS . The FSA has issued
proposed regulations to streamline the emergency loan
program administrative burdens on the FSA and borrowers.
The proposed regulations provide that in the case of loans in
excess of $300,000 where the applicant's net worth is in
excess of $1,000,000, the applicant must obtain three written
declinations of credit and at least one of which must be from
a lender outside the normal trade area of the applicant. The
requirement is reduced to two written declinations for loans
in excess of $300,000 where the applicant's net worth is
$1,000,000 or less and one declination for loans less than
$300,000. The written declination requirement may be
waived for loans less than $100,000.
The proposed regulations simplify the calculation of
qualifying production loss by calculating the eligible
production loss as the difference between the production
level for the disaster year and the production history for the
crops on the farm. The production history for the farm is to
be based on crop insurance and FSA data. In cases where
sufficient production history is not available, the three year
county production average for the crop is to be used. In
addition, in order to provide more assistance to borrowers,
the proposed rule will increase the loan level for production
loss emergency loans from 80 percent to 100 percent of the
eligible production loss.
The proposed rules provide that a borrower may use the
proceeds of a production loss emergency loan for the
purposes of replacing working capital lost as a result of the
disaster. This is not expressly provided in the current
regulations. The proposed regulations provide that livestock
losses will be treated as a physical loss instead of a
production loss as under the current rule. This change also
required an amendment to allow payment of essential family
household expenses from livestock physical loss loan
proceeds.
The proposed rules specifically allow the costs of restoring
perennials that produce an agricultural commodity to their
pre-disaster condition as an eligible purpose for physical loss
loans for the losses to chattel.
The proposed regulations eliminate the requirement that an
emergency loan must be secured by a particular amount of
collateral and require only that the applicant demonstrate an
ability to repay the loan on an on-going operational basis,
excluding special one-time sources of income or expenses.
The proposed regulations add definitions of the following
terms: “Act,” “agricultural commodity,” “allowable costs,”
“applicant,” “chattel,” “chattel or real estate essential to the
farming operation,” “debt forgiveness,” “disaster,” “disaster
area,” “disaster yield,” “essential family household
exp nses,” “entity,” “Farm Loan Program loan,” “farmer,”
“livestock,” “non-essential assets,” “normal production
yield,” “owner,” “physical losses,” “security value,” and
“trust.” 65 Fed. Reg. 54973 (Sept. 12, 2000), amending 7
C.F.R. §§ 1945.51 et seq.
MEAT INSPECTION . The plaintiffs were federal meat
and poultry inspectors, their union and a private organization.
The plaintiffs sought to enjoin the USDA from instituting
148 Agricultural Law Digest
*Agricultural Law Manual (ALM).
new meat inspection rules under which federal meat
inspectors would no longer do the inspection of meat
carcasses but would only oversee the inspection by
employees of the meat packers. The plaintiff argued that the
Federal Meat Inspection Act (FMIA), 21 U.S.C. § 604,
required the federal inspectors to do the inspections. The
USDA argued that the term “inspection” included observing
others do the inspection but the court held that the plain
meaning of the statute prohibited the USDA from allowing
anyone but federal inspectors to do the inspection of
processed meat. American Fed. Of Employees v.
Glickman, 215 F.3d 7 (D.C. Cir. 2000).
PERISHABLE AGRICULTURAL COMMODITIES
ACT . The defendant was a medical doctor who owned all of
the stock of a PACA-licensed produce dealer corporation.
The corporation purchased produce from the plaintiffs but did
not pay for all of it. The corporation did not have enough
assets, after liquidation of all accounts and property, to pay
for the produce. The plaintiffs sought recovery from the
defendant personally liable for the PACA trust fund shortfall
of the corporation. The plaintiffs cited Morris Okun, Inc. v.
Harry Zimmerman, Inc., 814 F. Supp. 346 (S.D. N.Y. 1993)
as authority for the defendant’s personal liability for the
PACA trust. The defendant argued that the defendant merely
owned the company as an investor and did not take part in
any of the management of the business; therefore, the
defendant should not be held liable for the corporation’s
failure to pay for the produce. The court cited Sunkist
Growers, Inc. v. Fisher, 104 F.3d 280 (9th Cir. 1997), in
support of its holding that a 100 percent shareholder was in
the position to control PACA trust assets held by the
corporation. The court held that the defendant breached a
fiduciary duty toward the PACA trust assets and was
personally liable for the failure of the corporation to preserve
PACA trust assets. The court noted that the PACA was a
“tough law” and that the defendant should have known that it
was the defendant’s personal responsibility to ensure that the
corporation preserved the PACA trust for produce sellers.
Golman-Hayden Co., Inc. v. Fresh Source Produce, Inc.,
217 F.3d 348 (5th Cir. 2000), aff’g, 27 F. Supp.2d 723
(N.D. Tex. 1998).
FEDERAL ESTATE
AND GIFT TAX
MARITAL DEDUCTION. The decedent’s will provided
for property passing to the surviving spouse in trust. The
surviving spouse initially sought the surviving spouse’s
elective share under state law but dismissed that claim. The
spouse then filed an action for an accounting and
determination of the dower share in the estate. In settlement
of that action, the estate agreed to pay the spouse $135,000
and transferred some real property to the spouse. The estate
claimed a marital deduction for the value of the settlement.
The court held that, under New Jersey law, the surviving
spouse did not have an enforceable right to terminate the trust
income interest in favor of a lump sum payment; therefore,
the money payment was not eligible for the marital deduction
because the settlement was not made in exchange for an
enforceable claim. Similarly, the court held that the transfer
of th  real estate in settlement of the dower claim was not
enforceable and not eligible for the marital deduction. Estate
of Mergott v. United States, 2000-2 U.S. Tax Cas. (CCH)
¶ 60,383 (D. N.J. 2000).
REVOCABLE TRANSFERS . The decedent had followed
an estate plan of reducing the decedent’s estate by making
annual gifts to relatives over 13 years. When the decedent’s
health began to fail, the decedent granted a board power of
attorney to the decedent’s daughter. During a time when the
decedent was medically and mentally infirm, the daughter
transferred several interests in real property to relatives who
had received direct gifts from the decedent. The IRS argued
that these late gifts were included in the decedent’s estate as
revocable gifts because the daughter did not have explicit
authority to make gifts for the decedent. The court examined
Oregon law to determine the scope of a power of attorney.
The court held that the gifts were valid and complete because
(1) there was no state case law or statute prohibiting an
inferred power to make gifts, (2) the Oregon law considered
the decedent’s intention in interpreting the power of attorney,
(3) there was a substantial pattern of gifting by the decedent
preceding the gifts made by the attorney-in-fact, (4) the gifts
made by the attorney-in-fact were consistent with the
decedent’s prior gifting, (5) the gifts did not deplete the
decedent’s estate assets to the estate’s detriment, and (6) it
was clear there had been no fraud or abuse by the attorney-in-
fact. Estate of Pruitt v. Comm’r, T.C. Memo. 2000-287.
TRUSTS. The decedent established a grantor retained
annuity trust (GRAT) for the decedent’s benefit for a fixed
term or until the decedent’s death. The decedent contributed
all of the trust corpus and filed a gift tax return and paid the
gift tax. The decedent received a percentage of the original
trust corpus in monthly annuity payments and the decedent’s
children where the reminder holders. The decedent died
before t  end of the term and the issue was the amount of
th  trust includible in the decedent’s gross estate. In a field
service advice letter, the IRS ruled that, under I.R.C. §
2039(b), the entire amount passing to the remainder holders
was included in the decedent’s estate because the decedent
contributed all of the trust corpus to the trust. Alternatively,
the IRS also ruled that the amount includible in the
decedent’s gross estate under I.R.C. § 2036 was the amount
of corpus necessary to yield the amount of the decedent’s
retained annuity, based upon the applicable federal rate under
I.R.C. § 7520 , as of the date of the decedent’s death. FSA
Ltr. Rul. 200036012, May 25, 2000.
FEDERAL INCOME
TAXATION
BAD DEBT DEDUCTION. The taxpayers, husband and
wife operated a trucking business. The husband owned all of
the stock of the first corporation. A second corporation was
formed which was capitalized with only $500 and half of the
shares were transferred to the husband and half to the wife.
The second corporation received cash advances from the first
corporation in exchange for promissory notes. However, the
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second corporation made no payments on the notes, no
interest was charged and the first corporation did not attempt
to collect any of the debt. The second corporation terminated
without repaying the notes. The second corporation claimed
discharge of indebtedness income from the notes and the first
corporation claimed a bad debt deduction. The court held that
the advances were capital contributions and not loans because
(1) no payments were scheduled or made, (2) the notes were
to be repaid solely from the second corporation’s earnings,
(3) the second corporation was undercapitalized and (4) the
second corporation made no attempt to borrow money from
unrelated parties, even though such loans were available. The
court held that the taxpayers were not entitled to a bad debt
deduction because no bona fide debt existed. Shedd v.
Comm’r, T.C. Memo. 2000-292.
C CORPORATIONS
CONSTRUCTIVE DIVIDENDS. The taxpayers, husband
and wife operated a trucking business. The husband owned
all of the stock of the first corporation. A second corporation
was formed which was capitalized with only $500 and half of
the shares were transferred to the husband and half to the
wife. The second corporation received cash advances from
the first corporation in exchange for promissory notes.
However, the second corporation made no payments on the
notes, no interest was charged and the first corporation did
not attempt to collect any of the debt. The second corporation
terminated without repaying the notes. The court held that the
advances were constructive dividends to the taxpayers
because (1) the payments were capital contributions to a
corporation controlled by the taxpayers (see case under BAD
DEBTS supra), and (2) the taxpayers failed to provide
evidence of a business purpose for the advances except to
transfer money. Shedd v. Comm’r, T.C. Memo. 2000-292.
CAPITAL GAIN . The IRS has adopted as final regulations
which provide that, for purposes of applying I.R.C. §
1(h)(7)(B) (which provides that a taxpayer's unrecaptured
section 1250 gain cannot exceed the taxpayer's net section
1231 gain), gain from the sale of a partnership, S corporation
or trust interest that results in section 1250 capital gain is not
treated as section 1231 gain even if section 1231 could apply
to the disposition of the underlying partnership property. The
IRS noted that, although section 1(h)(7) (in combination with
section 751) applies a limited look-through rule for purposes
of determining the capital gain rate applicable to the sale of a
partnership, S corporation or trust interest, no similar look-
through rule applies for purposes of applying section 1231.
65 Fed. Reg. 57092 (Sept. 21, 2000), adding Treas. Reg. §
1.1223-3.
DISASTER PAYMENTS . On September 1, 2000, the
president determined that certain areas in Idaho were eligible
for assistance under the Disaster Relief and Emergency
Assistance Act, 42 U.S.C. § 5121, as a result of wildfires
beginning on July 27, 2000. FEMA-1341-DR. On August
30, 2000, the President determined that certain areas in
Montana were eligible for assistance under the Act as a result
of a wildfires beginning on July 13, 2000. FEMA-1337-DR.
Accordingly, a taxpayer who sustained a loss attributable to
the disasters may deduct the loss on his or her 1999 federal
income tax return.
ELECTRICITY PRODUCTION CREDIT . The IRS has
announced that the electricity production credit inflation
factor for 2000 is 1.1382. Notice 2000-52, I.R.B. 2000-__.
HOBBY LOSSES. The taxpayers, husband and wife, were
fully employed and also operated a paso fino horse breeding
operation. The court held that the operation was not operated
with an intent to make a profit because (1) although the
taxpayers kept full and accurate records, the records were
insufficient and were not used to evaluate the profitability of
the business or to determine how to make the business
profitable; (2) the taxpayers were not expert breeders and did
not consult experts; (3) the operation had 11 years of losses;
(4) the assets did not appreciate in value sufficient to offset
the losses; and (5) the taxpayer derived significant personal
pleasure from the activity. McKeever v. Comm’r, T.C.
Memo. 2000-288.
LIKE-KIND EXCHANGES . The IRS has issued a
revenu  procedure which provides a safe harbor for some
types f “reverse Starker” like-kind exchanges under which
the IRS will not challenge (1) the qualification of property as
either “replacement property” or “relinquished property” (as
d fined in Treas. Reg. § 1.1031(k)-1(a)) for purposes of
I.R.C. § 1031 and the regulations thereunder or (2) the
treatment of the “exchange accommodation titleholder” as the
beneficial owner of such property for federal income tax
purposes, if the property is held in a “qualified exchange
accommodation arrangement” (QEAA).
Prop ty is considered as held in a QEAA if all of the
f llowing criteria are met:
“(1) The qualified indicia of ownership of the property is
held by a person who is not the taxpayer or a disqualified
person and either such person is subject to federal income tax
or, if such person is treated as a partnership or S corporation
for federal income tax purposes, more than 90 percent of its
interests or stock are owned by partners or shareholders who
are subject to federal income tax. Such qualified indicia of
ownership must be held by the exchange accommodation
titleholder at all times from the date of acquisition by the
exchange accommodation titleholder until the property is
transferred as described in section 4.02(5) of this revenue
procedure. For this purpose, “qualified indicia of ownership”
means legal title to the property, other indicia of ownership of
the property that are treated as beneficial ownership of the
property under applicable principles of commercial law (e.g.,
a contract for deed), or interests in an entity that is
disregarded as an entity separate from its owner for federal
income tax purposes (e.g., a single member limited liability
company) and that holds either legal title to the property or
such other indicia of ownership;
“(2) At the time the qualified indicia of ownership of the
property is transferred to the exchange accommodation
titleholder, it is the taxpayer’s bona fide intent that the
property held by the exchange accommodation titleholder
represent either replacement property or relinquished
property in an exchange that is intended to qualify for
nonrecognition of gain (in whole or in part) or loss under
§1031;
(3) No later than five business days after the transfer of
qualified indicia of ownership of the property to the exchange
accommodation titleholder, the taxpayer and the exchange
accommodation titleholder enter into a written agreement (the
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“qualified exchange accommodation agreement”) that
provides that the exchange accommodation titleholder is
holding the property for the benefit of the taxpayer in order to
facilitate an exchange under §1031 and this revenue
procedure and that the taxpayer and the exchange
accommodation titleholder agree to report the acquisition,
holding, and disposition of the property as provided in this
revenue procedure. The agreement must specify that the
exchange accommodation titleholder will be treated as the
beneficial owner of the property for all federal income tax
purposes. Both parties must report the federal income tax
attributes of the property on their federal income tax returns
in a manner consistent with this agreement;
(4) No later than 45 days after the transfer of qualified
indicia of ownership of the replacement property to the
exchange accommodation titleholder, the relinquished
property is properly identified. Identification must be made in
a manner consistent with the principles described in [Treas.
Reg.] § 1.1031(k)-1(c). For purposes of this section, the
taxpayer may properly identify alternative and multiple
properties, as described in [Treas. Reg.] § 1.1031(k)-1(c)(4);
“(5) No later than 180 days after the transfer of qualified
indicia of ownership of the property to the exchange
accommodation titleholder, (a) the property is transferred
(either directly or indirectly through a qualified intermediary
(as defined in [Treas. Reg.] § 1.1031(k)-1(g)(4))) to the
taxpayer as replacement property; or (b) the property is
transferred to a person who is not the taxpayer or a
disqualified person as relinquished property; and
“(6) The combined time period that the relinquished
property and the replacement property are held in a QEAA
does not exceed 180 days.”
The revenue procedure also identifes the permissable legal
and contractual arrangements for a QEAA:
“(1) An exchange accommodation titleholder that satisfies
the requirements of the qualified intermediary safe harbor set
forth in [Treas. Reg.] § 1.1031(k)-1(g)(4) may enter into an
exchange agreement with the taxpayer to serve as the
qualified intermediary in a simultaneous or deferred
exchange of the property under [I.R.C.] § 1031;
“(2) The taxpayer or a disqualified person guarantees some
or all of the obligations of the exchange accommodation
titleholder, including secured or unsecured debt incurred to
acquire the property, or indemnifies the exchange
accommodation titleholder against costs and expenses;
“(3) The taxpayer or a disqualified person loans or advances
funds to the exchange accommodation titleholder or
guarantees a loan or advance to the exchange accommodation
titleholder;
“(4) The property is leased by the exchange accommodation
titleholder to the taxpayer or a disqualified person;
“(5) The taxpayer or a disqualified person manages the
property, supervises improvement of the property, acts as a
contractor, or otherwise provides services to the exchange
accommodation titleholder with respect to the property;
“(6) The taxpayer and the exchange accommodation
titleholder enter into agreements or arrangements relating to
the purchase or sale of the property, including puts and calls
at fixed or formula prices, effective for a period not in excess
of 185 days from the date the property is acquired by the
exchange accommodation titleholder; and
“(7) The taxpayer and the exchange accommodation
titleholder enter into agreements or arrangements providing
that any variation in the value of a relinquished property from
the estimated value on the date of the exchange
accommodation titleholder’s receipt of the property be taken
into account upon the exchange accommodation titleholder’s
isposition of the relinquished property through the
taxpayer’s advance of funds to, or receipt of funds from, the
xchang  accommodation titleholder.” Rev. Proc. 2000-37,
I.R.B. 2000-__.
PARTNERSHIPS-ALM  § 7.03.*
SALE OF PARTNERSHIP INTEREST. The IRS has
adopted as final regulations which provide rules relating to
the allocation of a divided holding period with respect to an
interest in a partnership. These rules generally provide that
the holding period of a partnership interest will be divided if
a partner acquires portions of an interest at different times or
if an interest is acquired in a single transaction that gives rise
to different holding periods under section 1223. The holding
period of a portion of a partnership interest shall be
determined based on a fraction that is equal to the fair market
value of the portion of the partnership interest to which the
holding period relates (determined immediately after the
acquisition) over the fair market value of the entire
partnership interest. A selling partner may use the actual
holding period of the portion of a partnership interest sold if
the partnership is a “publicly traded partnership” (as defined
under section 7704(b)), the partnership interest is divided into
identifiable units with ascertainable holding periods, and the
selling partner can identify the portion of the interest
transferred. Otherwise, the holding period(s) of the
transferred interest must be divided in the same ratio as the
holding period(s) of the partner's entire partnership interest.
65 Fed. Reg. 57092 (Sept. 21, 2000), amending Treas. Reg.
§ 1.741-1(e), (f).
PENSION PLANS. For plans beginning in August 2000,
the weighted average is 5.98 percent with the permissible
range of 5.38 to 6.28 percent (90 to 106 percent permissible
range) and 5.38 to 6.57 percent (90 to 110 percent
permissible range) for purposes of determining the full
funding limitation under I.R.C. § 412(c)(7).  Notice 2000-46,
I.R.B. 2000-37, 265.
RENT. The negotiated a four year lease of a commercial
building space and paid the rent for the entire four years in
the first taxable year. The taxpayer claimed a rent deduction
for the entire payment for that taxable year. The taxpayer
argued hat the prepayment was made for the business reason
of obtaining a below market lease rate and removing a
guar ntee requirement for renewal of the lease. The renewal
did not occur until the end of the four year lease. The court
held that the prepayment of the rent did not have a substantial
business purpose because the prepayment was too remote
from the intended benefits. Howe v. Comm’r, T.C. Memo.
2000-291.
RETURNS. The IRS has announced the release of revised
Form 8869, Qualified Subchapter S Subsidiary Election. This
new version replaces the temporary procedures for filing a
qualified subchapter S subsidiary (QSub) election under
Notice 97-4. The form allows a parent S corporation to elect
to treat one or more of its subsidiaries as a QSub. The IRS
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also noted that Form 966, Corporate Dissolution or
Liquidation, may no longer be used to make a QSub election.
These documents are available at no charge (1) by calling the
IRS's toll-free telephone number, 1-800-829-3676; (2) via the
internet at http://www.irs.gov/prod/cover.html; (3) through
FedWorld; or (4) by directly accessing the Internal Revenue
Information Services bulletin board at (703) 321-8020.
S CORPORATIONS-ALM § 7.02[3][c].*
DISCHARGE OF INDEBTEDNESS. The taxpayers were
shareholders in an S corporation which manufactured coated
steel products. The corporation encountered financial troubles
and was forced into involuntary Chapter 7 bankruptcy in
1992. The case continued for four years and included interim
payments to creditors and negotiations with various parties. A
discharge was granted in 1996. The taxpayers claimed
discharge of indebtedness income from the S corporation in
1992 because the corporation was in bankruptcy, insolvent
and was not able to pay the claims against it. The court held
that no discharge of indebtedness occurred in 1992 because
the bankruptcy proceeding was still active and no discharge
was granted in that year; therefore, no identifiable event
occurred which discharged any debt. The court also held that,
even if discharge of indebtedness income was realized in
1992, the income could not be used to increase the
shareholders’ basis in the corporation. Friedman v.
Comm’r, 216 F.3d 537 (6th Cir. 2000), aff’g, T.C. Memo.
1998-196.
SAFE HARBOR INTEREST RATES
October 2000
AnnualSemi-annual Quarterly Monthly
Short-term
AFR 6.30 6.20 6.15 6.12
110 percent AFR 6.94 6.82 6.76 6.73
120 percent AFR 7.58 7.44 7.37 7.33
Mid-term
AFR 6.09 6.00 5.96 5.93
110 percent AFR 6.71 6.60 6.55 6.51
120 percent AFR 7.33 7.20 7.14 7.09
Long-term
AFR 5.96 5.87 5.83 5.80
110 percent AFR 6.56 6.46 6.41 6.37
120 percent AFR 7.16 7.04 6.98 6.94
Rev. Rul. 2000-45, I.R.B. 2000-__.
TRAVEL EXPENSES. The taxpayer was a tugboat
captain and was required to be away from the taxpayer’s
residence for 307 days in 1996. The taxpayer did not keep
records of incidental travel expenses for those days but did
present a written log of the tugboat which listed the days
worked by the taxpayer. The records showed (1) the dates of
the taxpayer’s departure and return from each city that the
taxpayer’s visited while away from home (the time
requirement), (2) the cities or points of locality of travel (the
place requirement), and (3) the business nexus between the
taxpayer’s employment and the taxpayer’s travel (the
business purpose requirement). The court held that the
taxpayer could deduct the incidental expense portion of the
applicable federal per diem rates for meals and incidental
expenses in Rev. Proc. 1996-28, 1996-1 C.B. 868 for the
1996 tax year. Westling v. Comm’r, T.C. Memo. 2000-289;
Johnson v. Comm’r, 115 T.C. No. 16 (2000).
NEGLIGENCE
RECREATIONAL IMMUNITY. The plaintiff was
injured while viewing the livestock exhibit at a county fair
sponsored by the defendant. The plaintiff was injured when
struck from behind by a pig in the exhibit. The defendant
argued that it was immune from liability for the injuries
under Neb. Stat. § 37-729(3) because the plaintiff was
participating in recreational activities at the fair. The statute
did not specifically include or exclude county fair activities
as covered recreational activities but listed several other
activities and “otherwise using land for purposes of the user”
which the court interpreted as including activities similar to
the enumerated activities. The court characterized the
enumerated activities as activities which required active
participation of the user; therefore, the court held that visiting
a county fair livestock exhibit was not covered by the statute
because the activity did not require active participation of the
visitors. The dissent argued that some of the enumerated
activities did not require active participation and were similar
enough in nature to county fair visitation to include the
plaintiff’s activities as covered by the statute. Dykes v. Scotts
Bluff Cty. Ag. Society, 260 Neb. 375, __ N.W.2d __ (2000).
The plaintiff was injured while riding a horse  as part of a
horse ride sponsored by the defendant. The defendant’s
employees prepared the horses and chose the plaintiff’s horse
based on the plaintiff’s lack of horse riding experience. Late
in the ride, the plaintiff’s saddle became loose and slipped
around the horse’s belly, throwing the plaintiff to the ground.
The defendant argued that it was not liable for the injury
because a loose saddle was an inherent risk of horse riding
and Wyo. Stat. § 1-1-122 limited the duty of a provider of
recreational activities to risks which were not inherent to the
activity. The court held that a loose saddle was an inherent
risk of horse riding and the defendant was not liable for the
injury to the plaintiff because the plaintiff failed to show any
other cause of the slipping which was not an inherent risk of
horse riding. The plaintiff had presented testimony that the
saddle slippage was caused by the failure to cinch the saddle
strap tightly enough, but the court held that was part of the
inherent risk of horse riding because the cinching of the strap
was a judgment of the person who saddled the horse.
Cooperman v. David, 214 F.3d 1162 (10th Cir. 2000),
aff’g, 23 F. Supp.2d 1315 (D. Wyo. 1999).
CITATION UPDATES
Gaudiano v. Comm’r, 216 F.3d 524 6th Cir. 2000)
(discharge of indebtedness), see p 110 supra.
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AGRICULTURAL TAX AND LAW SEMINARS
in Florida
by Neil E. Harl and Roger A. McEowen
January 9-12, 2001 Jacksonville/St. Augustine, Florida
Planning is almost complete for our newest seminar in the Jacksonville/St. Augustine, Florida area. Come join us in
America’s vacationland for expert seminars on the hottest topics in agricultural tax and law.
The seminars will be Tuesday, Wednesday, Thursday, and Friday, January 9-12, 2001. Registrants may attend one, two,
three or all four days, with separate pricing for each combination. On Tuesday, Roger McEowen will cover current
developments in many areas of agricultural law. On Wednesday, Roger McEowen will cover farm and ranch business
planning. On Thursday, Dr. Harl will speak about farm and ranch income tax. On Friday, Dr. Harl will cover farm and
ranch estate planning. Your registration fee includes comprehensive annotated seminar materials for the days attended
which will be updated just prior to the seminar. The seminar materials will also be available on CD-ROM for a small
additional charge. Continental buffet breakfasts and break refreshments are also included in the registration fee.
Here are some of the major topics to be covered:
• Legal developments in farm contracts, secured transactions, bankruptcy, real property, water law, torts, and
environmental law.
• Organizing the farm business--one entity or two, corporations, general and limited partnerships and limited liability
companies.
• Taxation of debt, taxation of bankruptcy, the latest on SE tax of rental of land to a family-owned entity; income
averaging; earned income credit; commodity futures transactions; paying wages in kind.
• Federal estate tax, including 15-year installment payment of federal estate tax, co-ownership discounts, alternate
valuation date, special use valuation, family-owned business deduction (FOBD), handling life insurance, marital deduction
planning, disclaimers, planning to minimize tax over deaths of both spouses, trusts, and generation skipping transfer tax.
• Gifts and federal gift tax, including problems with future interests, handling estate freezes, and “hidden” gifts.
• Income tax aspects of property transfer, including income in respect of decedent, installment sales, private annuities,
self-canceling installment notes, and part gift/part sale transactions.
Special room discounts are available at the hotel.  Be sure to tell them that you are attending the agricultural law
seminar.
The seminar registration fees    for current subscribers    to the Agricultural Law Digest, the Agricultural Law Manual, or
Principles of Agricultural Law are $175 (one day), $340 (two days), $490 (three days), and $620 (four days).  The
registration fees for     n nsubscribers    are $195, $380, $550 and $700, respectively. Please Note: the registration fees are
higher for registrations within 10 days prior to the seminar, so please call for availability and the correct fees. A registration
form will be available online at www.agrilawpress.com
For more information, call/fax Robert Achenbach at 1-541-302-1958, or e-mail at robert@agr awpress.com
